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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Only recently have the direct and indirect ‘European’ impacts (of political outcomes at the 
European level) on domestic political systems started to be studied (i.e. Spanou, 1998; 
Bulmer and Burch, 1998 and 2001; Kassim, Peters and Wright, eds. 2000; Goetz and Hix, 
eds. 2001; Knill, 2001; Schneider and Aspinwall, eds. 2001; Goetz, ed., 2001; Laffan, 
2001b). For the purpose of our paper, we understand Europeanization processes as the 
impacts of EU integration on specific countries' political institution-building and institutional 
adjustments including constitutional and administrative law, as well as on how the political 
system is organized and operated.  
 
This paper focuses on one of the three alternative perspectives of the ‘top-down’ approach to 
studying the processes of Europeanization as defined by Goetz (2001), namely the linkage 
perspective. Obviously, for recent new EU member states it is the national administrative 
adjustments for negotiating accession with the EU that have so far prevailed over national 
administrative adjustments made in the circumstances of (very recent) full EU membership.  
 
Our comparative research of three EU accession states/recent new EU member states, in 
line with a dynamic view, include Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia. While taking some key 
common features of the selected countries into account, the countries’ idiosyncrasies 
including variations in the institutional adaptation of their core executives relying on research 
findings in the framework of the European project ‘Organizing for Enlargement’ are 
investigated. Preliminary comparative research findings and tentative conclusions on 
variables that may cause variations in the adaptation of national administrations to the 
European integration challenges in the three (otherwise in some respects) relatively similar 
countries are presented.     3
1 INTRODUCTION
1 
 
1.1 Research problem 
 
In this paper we focus on the ‘European’ impacts (of political outcomes at the European 
level) on domestic political systems. Europeanization processes are understood as the 
impacts of EU integration on specific countries' political institution-building and institutional 
adjustments including constitutional and administrative law, as well as on how the political 
system is organized and operated. In our paper we focus on one of the three alternative 
perspectives of the ‘top-down’ approach to studying Europeanization processes as defined 
by Goetz (2001), namely the linkage perspective. 
 
The key findings in the existing literature on executive adaptation point to: a) a stagist 
approach to adaptation as a rule; and b) the continuing diversity of domestic responses to 
EU engagement (e.g. Kassim, 2000; Knill, 2001; Bulmer and Burch, 2001; Olsen, 2002; 
Laffan, 2001b and 2003). When looking at the member states of the time, Harmsen (1999) 
stressed that their administrations had also predominately retained their distinctive structures 
and operating procedures when dealing with European matters. Bulmer and Burch (1998) 
also found no strong evidence in the case of the UK of the expectation that the national 
administrative structures of member states necessarily change substantially due to 
Europeanization. Spanou (1998) clearly stressed that the Greek politico-administrative 
system could only follow pre-established paths and features when adjusting to European 
integration. On the basis of research by Hix and Goetz (2002) and Dimitrakopolous,
2 Page 
(2003) expresses doubts that the impact of the EU (Europeanization) is sufficiently powerful 
to bring about similarities between national coordinating mechanisms.  
 
While these and other authors reveal that in practice Europeanization means the adaptation 
of national structures, processes and actors and not the replacement of the ‘old’ national 
ones with one that is ‘European-modeled’ in the case of ‘Western European’ member states, 
it is still possible to find opposite and quite stereotyped views when looking at accession/new 
member states. Goetz (2001: 218) is one of the (still relatively rare) authors who warn about 
the simplistic approach to adapting ‘post-Communist executives’ to ‘the European 
Administrative space’. In the paper we argue that there are some common features among 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on research results of the European project ‘Organizing for Enlargement: A 
Challenge for Member States and Candidate Countries’ (HPSE-CT-2001-00083), the EU’s Fifth 
Framework Programme (http://www.oeue.net). 
2 Page quotes Dimitrakopolous’ Ph.D. thesis (1997) Beyond Transposition: A Comparative Inquiry into 
the Implementation of European Public Policy, University of Hull.   4
states (societies) which experienced communist party rule, but there are still important 
variations between them which should be regarded as relevant variables (idiosyncrasies). 
Without taking these variations into account, variations in how different nations adapt to 
managing EU matters in these countries cannot be explained. 
 
Following this starting point we believe it is of great value to compare national adaptation to 
the management of EU affairs where experience with communist rule is just one (a cluster of) 
variable(s) taken into account. Even here some similarities and patterns in the ways core 
executives adapt organizationally and procedurally to the challenges of managing EU 
matters can be found. For example, Laffan (2003) discovered that two variables stand out 
when explaining variation across six investigated states (three member states of Ireland, 
Greece, Finland and three newcomer states of Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia) when looking 
at the level of institutionalization and the relationship between formal and informal processes. 
Still, the EU newcomer states (Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary) do not fall into the same state 
clusters when specific characteristics of the institutional adaptation of the executive, 
procedures and agents for dealing with EU matters are investigated. Despite some already 
discovered patterns, which factors determine the mode of a national administration’s 
response including structures, actors and processes still need to be thoroughly examined.  
 
The aim of our paper is a preliminary overview of possible variables that cause variations 
between the three EU new(coming) states in managing EU affairs: Slovenia, Hungary and 
Estonia. In the first  part of the paper we describe some key common features of these 
countries in order to be aware of the (at least to some extent) controlled variables. The 
second part sums up countries’ idiosyncrasies including variations in institutional adaptation 
of their core executives relying on research findings in the framework of the European project 
‘Organizing for Enlargement’. In the third part we examine the role of selected variables we 
expect to influence the modes and ways of national adaptation in (otherwise in some 
respects) relatively similar countries. The preliminary comparative research findings and 
tentative conclusions on the variables that seem to cause variations in how national 
administrations adapt to European integration challenges are presented.   
 
1.2 Some common features of the institutional adaptation of post-socialist EU- 
newcomer countries  
 
Europeanization processes are not only limited to EU member states but also embrace 
states closely connected with the EU. This is especially the case of countries negotiating full 
EU membership (Goetz, 2001; Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2003; Ágh, 2003). Democratization of   5
former socialist countries, the collapse of the military-political division of Europe and 
cleavages between politically defined ‘blocs’ and economic borders during the Cold War 
created pressure on the EU to open itself up to new members. In the past fifteen years, most 
post-socialist countries have been confronted with two main political-institutional challenges, 
although some have even encountered three major challenges: 
 
a)  building the institutions and practices of a democratic political system and a market 
economy; 
b)  institutional adaptation to Europeanization processes; and 
c)  building an independent state including the establishment of institutions previously set 
up in political centers of the former multinational states to which they used to belong 
(such as Slovenia and Estonia). 
 
Like older member states, the newcomers have also passed through several stages of ‘EU 
Europeanization’ (Lippert, Umbach and Wesseles, 2001). Even in the early stages, the 
integration of post-socialist countries with the EU started to interfere with the national political 
systems of these countries. The EU indirectly influenced national political systems and their 
practices by evaluating and estimating the level of democracy achieved (first in applicant 
countries and later in candidate countries). Direct institutional adaptation as a result of the 
co-ordination of EU affairs and implementing of its policies can partly be described as an 
outcome of EU demands made during the negotiating process and partly as an expression of 
the economic, political and security interests of those states seeking full EU membership.  
 
While old(er) members of the emerging supranational state were involved in its creation in 
terms of its polity and policies, the latest newcomers (such as Slovenia, Estonia and 
Hungary) had to incorporate its policies and institutionally adapt before having a say in the 
formation of the EU. As a result, 'foreign affairs' (relative to the EU) had in fact (in a way) 
been made ‘domestic’ before formal EU membership. The impacts of Europeanization 
processes were already largely reflected in individual states’ negotiations on EU integration 
when candidate states started by gradually building up their institutional relations with the 
EU. This area is not a novelty in the history of EU enlargement.
3 
 
                                                 
3 Bulmer and Burch (1998a) in their longitudinal research on British institutional adaptation to the EU, 
for example, ascertained that the most radical changes were accepted in 1960-1961, thus well before 
the third and successful application of Great Britain to join the EU. Actual integration with the EU at 
Great Britain’s national level triggered ‘merely’ the (ad hoc) adaptation of structures and procedures, 
which were already developed during the negotiations, to the broader needs of membership but did 
not trigger any (new) radical institutional changes.    6
The most obvious need for institutional adaptation at the national level is the inter-ministerial 
co-ordination of EU affairs. This is necessary in the circumstances of full EU membership 
negotiations and in the conditions of full EU membership. For candidate countries, the need 
for co-ordination mechanisms derives especially from the inter-sectoral and interdisciplinary 
nature of EU membership negotiations. Only effective co-ordination at the national level of a 
candidate state supports successful, qualitative and prompt adaptations to the EU’s 
legislation and adoption of the acquis communautaire and, at the same time, partly increases 
the negotiating strength of individual candidate countries. However, full membership in the 
supranational structure sui generis brings some additional demands for the effective co-
ordination of EU affairs at the national level. Namely, due to the specific structure of decision-
making procedures in EU institutions the ability of member states to assert their interests in 
decision-making at the EU level depend on prompt and substantively adequate co-ordination. 
Therefore, it is very important that all national (governmental) representatives act 
strategically and coherently at all levels of EU decision-making. However, this is only 
possible when inter-ministerial national co-ordination is efficient. 
 
From the democratic process and legitimacy points of view, it is important to also look at the 
bigger picture: not only how the national executive is efficient in managing EU affairs but also 
to what extent is its decision-making made in relation to other national policy-making 
institutions and (governmental and non-governmental) actors. 
 
1.3 Common characteristics of Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia 
 
All three countries may be regarded as 'happy and success stories' in several respects 
(successful transition to democracy, only a minor or no involvement in war, good economic 
development, in the case of Slovenia and Estonia also the international recognition of new 
independent states together with their inclusion in various international integrations including 
European integration processes). 
 
An evaluation of accession states and their achievements relative to various criteria set by 
the EU had been taking place, but with a variety of results. Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia 
were among EU accession countries forming a group with relatively favorable socio-
economic conditions (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Selected indicative data on the three states’ readiness for EU accession 
Candidate 
state 
Population 
(in mill.)
1 
Size in 
1000 
km
2 
GDP per 
capita by 
purchasing 
power 1997
3 
and 2001
4  
(in USD) 
% GNP pc 
from 
agriculture in 
1995
5 
Inflation in 
1997
6 and 
2001
4 
(in %) 
Country's 
contribution 
to EU budget 
(in 1000 
million ECU)
7 
Country's 
net 
receipts 
from the 
EU
7 
EU 
budget 
costs 
(in billion 
ECU)
7 
Slovenia       2.0      20  12,755 / 
16,000 
     4.8  9.2 / 
8.4 
85 124  0.2 
Estonia       1.5      45   N/A / 
10,000 
     7.1  10.8 / 
5.8 
64 364  0.6 
Hungary     10.2      93   7,318 / 
12,000 
     7.0  18.2 / 
9.2 
48 223  2.3 
N/A - not available
 
1 Agenda 2000, p. 66. 
2 Agenda 2000, p. 66. 
3 Slovenian Economic Mirror 7/98, sources of data reported: OECD, WIIW, IMAD. 
4 Delo, 13 December 2002, sources of data reported: CIA, Infobase Europe, European Union. 
5 Transition, World Bank, April 1998, p. 12. 
6 Inflation (private consumption deflator) in 1997, European Dialogue, No. 1, Jan-Feb. 1998.
 
7 Mencinger, 1995: 37 (source: Brussels, 1994). 
 
 
In Agenda 2000 it was concluded for all three countries that they had fulfilled the political and 
economic criteria but needed to do more in both the process of implementing the acquis and 
public administration reform (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Brief presentation of applicant states’ evaluations in Agenda 2000 (rough estimates 
of achievements and capacities – in the Agenda 2000 text accompanied by criticisms and 
suggestions) 
Candidate 
state 
Political criteria  Economic 
criteria 
Aquis Administrative 
reform 
Final proposal 
Slovenia  fulfilled fulfilled  needs  effort indispensable  positive 
 
Hungary  fulfilled fulfilled  needs  effort indispensable  positive 
 
Estonia  fulfilled fulfilled  needs  effort indispensable  positive 
 
Czech 
Republic 
fulfilled fulfilled  needs  effort indispensable  positive 
Poland  fulfilled fulfilled  needs  effort indispensable  positive 
 
 
Bulgaria 
on the way to 
fulfilling 
limited  uncertain  substantial  reform 
needed 
negative 
Latvia  satisfactory, but the 
Russian-speaking 
part to be better 
integrated 
serious 
difficulties 
with considerable 
effort should be 
able 
indispensable negative 
Lithuania  fulfilled serious 
difficulties 
with considerable 
effort should be 
able 
indispensable 
 
negative 
Romania  on the way to 
satisfying 
serious 
difficulties 
uncertain  substantial  reform 
needed 
negative 
Slovakia  does not satisfy  satisfactory, but 
needs progress 
needs effort  reform is taking 
place 
negative 
Source: Fink-Hafner (1999: 791). 
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2 VARIATIONS IN INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ADAPTATION FOR 
MANAGING EU AFFAIRS 
 
2.1 Differences between Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia 
 
Despite many similarities between the investigated countries, at least to some extent certain 
variables can probably help explain the important variations seen in the institutional and 
procedural adaptation of domestic political systems (primarily executives) to the managing of 
EU affairs. Kassim (2000) explains very different systems of co-ordination in member states 
by five characteristics of the domestic polity: policy style; policy ambition; conception of co-
ordination; the nature of the political opportunity structure; and the administrative opportunity 
structure. Bulmer and Burch (2001) - comparing UK and Germany - stress the impact of 
national traditions of government. Goetz and Wollmann (2001) mention some other possible 
variables, such as: characteristics of the constitutional system (especially the role and 
position of the Prime Minister relative to other political institutions), politicization of the public 
administration, personnel policy (professionalization of staff), hierarchies within government, 
political constellations and progress in democratic consolidations. Brusis and Dimitrov (2001) 
added the configuration of core executive institutions (particularly the positions of the prime 
minister and finance minister). We hypothesize that relevant variables include administrative 
traditions (such as a tradition of a formalized public administration), political culture – 
especially the (non)existence of consultative politics (including corporatist traditions), 
frequency of political changes in government and recent historical experience with managing 
political and policy issues in the framework of a multinational (con)federal state. 
 
Recent experiences within multinational states and membership in international 
integrations 
 
The investigated countries have relatively different experiences with their recent historical 
involvement in multinational state functioning. While Hungary has been an independent 
state, although closely linked to the Soviet Union for an important period of time, Estonia was 
part of the Soviet Union with quite different relations between its territorial political units than 
was seen in former Yugoslavia. Since the 1970s Slovenia (like other former Yugoslav 
republics) were involved in a federal political system as units with specific, constitutionally 
defined and guaranteed autonomies
4 (such as a whole range of public policies created and 
                                                 
4 The adopting of separate constitutions together with the federal one in 1974, bringing about an 
important expansion of the republics’ autonomy, is often seen by researchers and politicians as an act 
of establishing the confederal character of the socialist Yugoslav system.   9
implemented under the republics’ jurisdiction and their functioning as confederal units in 
many respects). The practical autonomy of the federal units, their gradually intensified 
special political subjectivity, which evolved into the establishment of several political systems 
within Yugoslavia (e.g. early transition to democracy in Slovenia at a time the federal system 
was still socialist) made Slovenia learn to behave as a (quasi) state creating negotiating 
positions for its delegates who were politically struggling and negotiating within federal 
political institutions across many policy areas especially during the 1980s.   
 
Slovenia (as both part of former Yugoslavia and a non-member of the Eastern bloc) held a 
special status and relations with the EC earlier than any other socialist country. Economic 
and social interactions with the EC and its member states were part of Slovenian life even in 
socialist times, particularly when Yugoslavia signed a special agreement with the EC in 1970. 
When Slovenia became an independent state in 1991 it continued its economic relations with 
the EC on the basis of agreements signed by former Yugoslavia. Soon after the EC formally 
and politically recognized Slovenia (in 1992) the Slovenian project of European integration 
gained momentum. 
 
In 1991, Estonia regained its independence from the Soviet Union and from that point on it 
left behind the pattern of relationships established between the Soviet Union and its biggest 
successors on one hand, and the EC/EU on the other. Due to the idiosyncrasies of the 
Soviet Union we expect that Estonia’s learning process as a relatively autonomous actor 
within that multinational state cannot be regarded as being similar to Slovenia’s.  
 
Hungary is a special case combining: a) characteristics of a state with its own formally 
established and internationally recognized political-territorial borders; and b) simultaneously 
its close relations with the Soviet Union (membership in Comecon and the Cold War 
politically/militarily defined Soviet bloc) disintegrated during the last wave of democratization 
in Europe. 
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Table 3: Membership in international integrations  
Country  Member of 
Comecon? 
Past membership 
in world divisions 
Splits (S)/rebellions 
(R) against Soviet 
dominance 
CEFTA 
member? 
Accepted for 
first wave of 
NATO 
enlargement? 
Accepted for 
second wave 
of NATO 
enlargement 
(2004)? 
Slovenia - 
Yugoslavia  
no Non-aligned 
movement 
S 1948  yes  no  yes 
Hungary  yes  Soviet bloc  R 1956  yes  yes  / 
Czech 
Republic 
yes  Soviet bloc  R 1968  yes  yes  / 
Poland  yes  Soviet bloc  R 1956 
R 1980 
yes yes  / 
Estonia - 
Soviet 
Union  
yes Soviet  bloc  N/A  no
*  no yes 
* In 1995 all Baltic states sought CEFTA membership. But an OECD Report published in 1999 noted that Estonia 
and Latvia were no longer seeking CEFTA membership, while Lithuania intended to join CEFTA once it met the 
preconditions namely, that the country has concluded an EU Association Agreement, it is a member of the World 
Trade Organization and it has bilateral trade agreements with all CEFTA members (see 
http://www.cefta.org/cefta/invite.htm, 19.3.2005). 
 
 
Administrative traditions and political cultural traditions 
 
Comparisons in this area are still difficult to draw in the current stage of research. Research 
findings available to the author at the time of writing allow some space for a tentative thesis 
that the administrative traditions in the investigated countries differ enough to consider them 
as involving a significant variety. While in Slovenia Germanic-influenced traditions persist 
despite the transition’s challenges to democracy and some attempts to introduce culture and 
more stable patterns of co-ordination and new public management approaches, it seems that 
in Hungary the continental type of public administration involving institutionalization and 
formalization lost momentum during the transition to a democracy and the early stage of 
democratic consolidation to start reappearing in the later stage of consolidation (Ágh and 
Rózsás, 2003: 36). Drechsler (2004) stresses that the Estonian public administration is still 
significantly in the stage of establishing itself as a fully professional and functioning public 
administration. 
 
Also when looking at the political culture of individual countries many differences can be 
identified. It is especially indicative to look at the (non)existence of consultative politics – 
including corporatist traditions. Here Slovenia stands out as a case of quite a strong and old 
tradition of consultative, particularly corporatist traditions.
5 Already in the mid-1990s Ágh 
(1996: 245) described the new Slovenian situation as being ‘closest to the Austrian’ one in 
the Central and Eastern European region. Hungary has had many active NGOs which have 
                                                 
5 These traditions are closely linked to Slovenia’s historical interlinking with the Germanic world – 
especially long-term living under Austrian rule.   11
not been fully incorporated into consultative politics. Attempts at establishing a ‘corporatist’ 
way of making and implementation policies have been made, but under the various 
governments it seems this has not developed in a way comparable to the Slovenian 
example. Estonia is usually cited as an example of a post-socialist country with few civil 
initiatives, NGOs as well as weak democratic traditions in that sense (e.g. Kaldor and 
Vejvoda, 1999: 19-20; Ruutsoo, 1996: 101). 
 
Frequency of political changes in government 
 
Slovenia’s and Hungary’s modes of transition to a democracy are often regarded as a 
combination of pressure from the bottom (replacement) and adaptation from the top 
(transformation), meaning transplacement. Although Estonia similarly experienced 
oppositional movements and oppositional proto parties during the last years of the 1980s as 
well as the reforming of the old elite under such pressure, the special feature of its ‘singing 
revolution’ was the outstanding struggle to regain the status of an independent state (Ruus, 
1999; Mikkel, 2004) and the persistent ethnic cleavage in politics involving the relationship 
between the Estonian state and the relatively large Russian minority. Slovenia’s prime 
struggle for economic and political change interfered with the struggle for an independent 
state only when the required changes could not gain enough political consensus between the 
republic’s political elites and the federal elite within the federal state (former Yugoslavia). 
 
While the transitions to democracy were not extremely different in the three countries (they 
were all gradual and non-violent), the political dynamics seen after their first elections have 
not been as comparably similar. On the surface this is reflected in differences in the 
dynamics of changes in government. Probably the special features of the political systems 
involved, including the electoral system, do play a role in this but for the purposes of our 
paper we will only look at changes in government. 
 
While Slovenia had the same centre-party led coalition governments in the 1992-2004 period 
with just a six-month break in 2000, Estonia only experienced an intermezzo of a government 
of experts (March 1997-March 1999) in otherwise the same Prime Minister-led right 
governments (October 1992-November 1994 and March 1999-January 2002).
6 Hungary is an 
exception here with its clear ideological shifts in governments. 
                                                 
6 In Slovenia the leading party Liberal Democracy of Slovenia had been gaining more and more 
support by the 2000 parliamentary elections (it then won 36.2% of the votes), but it lost the 2004 
parliamentary elections (Fink-Hafner, 2002; Fink-Hafner, 2004; Ramet and Fink-Hafner, eds., in print). 
In Estonia right parties have kept gaining increasing electoral support since the first free elections,   12
Table 4: Selected key characteristics of constitutional and political developments in the 
transition to a democracy in Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary 
Country  Mode of 
transition to 
democracy 
Constitutional 
system 
Creating a new 
independent 
state? 
Change in government during the 
process of EU integration  
Slovenia 
(Yugoslavia) 
transplacement 
 
parliamentary  yes  no significant change by the end of 
2004 
Hungary  transplacement parliamentary  no  shifts in government 
 
Estonia 
(Soviet Union) 
transplacement 
(elements of 
“ruptura”) 
parliamentary  yes   intermediate government of experts 
within  a longer period of the same 
PM-led governments 
 
 
2.2 Models of executive adaptation 
 
Key models  
 
The primary distinction between centralized and decentralized models of managing EU 
affairs is: a) the presence/absence of one (strong) central co-ordination unit with 
responsibility for co-ordinating the work of all sectoral departments; and b) the 
presence/absence of several co-ordination units across the national administrative system, 
which are mutually intertwined. The third, federal model of co-ordinating EU issues at the 
national level is peculiar since it expresses the complex structure of states with federal 
arrangements
7 that demand specific adaptations.  
 
On this basis, EU member states can be seen as belonging to three models with regard to 
the co-ordination of EU affairs at the national level: centralized, decentralized and federal 
models. A variety of decentralized and centralized models can be found along the continuum 
from the relative or even complete autonomy of particular ministries (the lead ministry 
principle) to the focal role of a central governmental department (office) for co-ordinating EU 
issues. The centralized model reflects its key concept that the organization and co-ordination 
of inter-sectoral negotiations and harmonization within a member state and managing of 
negotiations at all levels in Brussels are conducted by one department (office), independent 
or directly subordinate to the Prime Minister, and which ensures congruency in the work of 
individual ministries. On the contrary, the decentralized model of co-ordinating EU affairs is 
based on the principle of the autonomy of individual ministries and absence of any central 
governmental department as the only body responsible for inter-sectoral co-ordination within 
a member state or for preparing common national positions to be advocated in EU 
                                                                                                                                                          
winning as much as 49.8% of the votes at the 2003 parliamentary elections (Ruus, 1999; Mikkel, 
2004). 
7 In those states political decisions and implementation responsibilities are divided between regional 
units and the federal level.    13
institutions on behalf of its representatives. Hence, in the decentralized model each ministry 
is responsible for co-ordination within its own policy field.  
 
Prime Minister versus Minister for Foreign Affairs centrality in the three countries 
 
Slovenia 
 
The co-ordination of European affairs in Slovenia developed in response to needs emerging 
in the integration process. In the beginning of the process each department worked on its 
own field while some attempts to coordinate the management of EU business remained 
ineffective. A relatively dispersed and decentralized system needed to be adapted in 
circumstances of the greater intensity and deepening of European integration. In December 
1997 a special independent office was established – the Government Office for European 
Affairs, which was led by a Minister without portfolio. New Office took over the personnel, 
tasks and main facilities of the former Office for European Affairs located within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Government Office for European Affairs
8 took on responsibility for 
managing and co-coordinating the entire process of Slovenia’s accession to the EU. When 
the Office was established (December 1997) it started operating with 17 employees, but by 
spring 2002 it expanded already to a total of 117 employees. Parallel to that Office, the 
Negotiating team of the Republic of Slovenia for Accession to the European Union was 
formed, as were 31 Working Groups for preparing negotiation positions. At the end of 1997 
and start of 1998 therefore a key, radical change brought about a shift towards a centralized 
system of “EU” co-ordination, as well as the outset of tendencies toward systemic 
internalization of European business. 
 
The line ministers remained the “lead ministers” in articulation of national positions on 
particular EU issues ministers. Different departments have established various forms of 
internal coordination, but they all emphasized informal contacts as well.  The newly 
established Government Office for European Affairs became a focal point on the EU gained 
responsibility to ensure the effective co-operation  and circulation of information among 
individual departments (horizontal co-ordination), as well as coherence and consistency on 
different EU policy issues.  
 
                                                 
8 Within the Office, among other units, also a special Department for Negotiations was established.   14
The Europeanization process has not caused any substantial changes to the administrative 
structure of the Prime Minister’s role, nor the role of his Office.
9 “European duties” were 
simply added to PM’s and Council of Ministers’ functions. Within the PM’s Office no special 
EU department was established. During the negotiating process, the Prime Minister 
represented the top of the ‘co-ordination pyramid’ on European business. He did not pay 
much attention to day-to-day issues and questions of organizational capacity. He mostly 
focused on strategic issues and therefore did not go into the details of EU matters.
10 The 
Prime Minister generally left the daily co-ordination of European business to the Minister of 
European Affairs. Notwithstanding this, because of the high complexity and intensity of 
Europeanization processes he maintained constant links with the key people, i.e. particularly 
with ministers (and to a smaller extent also with state secretaries) from other relevant 
departments.
11 
 
The Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the EU, formally accredited to EU in 1993, was 
adapted and set up in 1998 in the sense of preparing for accession negotiations. As a 
specific, atypical diplomatic representation it became the central node of Slovenia’s 
administration in Brussels taking care of effective (formal and informal) communication and 
the circulation of information between Ljubljana and Brussels. By 2003 it had grown 
considerably and transformed into the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Slovenia 
to the EU. 
  
Some elements of polycentrism in the institutional practice produced various institutional 
interests and ideas during the accession period about the future development of the 
‘Slovenian model’ of co-ordinating EU affairs (despite the elaborated co-ordinating 
mechanisms), which to some extent complicated the political decision on the reform needed. 
These alternative ideas were mostly reflected in different preferences conditional on specific 
                                                 
9 The Slovenian Prime Minister leads, directs and co-ordinates the work and is responsible for whole 
government’s functioning.  
10 The Prime Minister’s main responsibility in co-ordinating EU business at the national level was 
therefore mostly to resolve any inter-ministerial conflicts and to interpose himself between ministries 
where there were different positions on specific EU issues. In this context, whenever the pre-
accession or negotiation process required inter-ministerial co-ordination the so-called European 
meeting (collegiate body) of the government was convened for all ministers in question. This 
European collegiate body was regarded as a political co-ordination of the Prime Minister, which only 
dealt with strategic issues of Slovenia’s accession to the EU and directed the preparations for 
negotiations. It was convened as required and comprised the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, 
European Minister, Finance Minister and a member of the Negotiating Team. Any other members 
attending the meeting were invited in accordance with a particular emphasis on current or prospective 
issues on the agenda.  
11 The most important departments here were the Government Office for European Affairs, the 
Negotiating Team of the Republic of Slovenia for Accession to the EU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Finance.   15
interests, as well as on external pressures. Four main alternatives of adaptation in the 
circumstances of full EU membership were articulated by spring 2002, but they were not all 
formalized by way of elaborated alternative solutions. These alternatives were as follows: 
•  establishment of a central co-ordination unit, either independent or directly 
subordinate to the Prime Minister (a kind of reformed Government Office for 
European Affairs); 
•  establishment of a special department or sector within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
•  establishment of a special department or sector within another ministry (for example 
finance); or 
•  shifting the central co-ordination role to the jurisdiction of the Permanent 
Representation of the Republic of Slovenia to the EU. 
 
While the government led by the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) decided to 
institutionalize the central co-coordinating unit (the reformed Government Office for 
European Affairs) in February 2003 and to maintain a Minister without portfolio, the change in 
government at the end of 2004 brought about the abolition of this ministerial position as well 
as the Government Office for European Affairs despite the serious criticism of this made by 
the LDS. The State Secretary responsible for European affairs became a member of the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet.
12 
 
Hungary 
 
Unlike Slovenia, which experienced gradual institutionalization and procedural adaptation of 
the management of European affairs predominantly to answer the challenges of specific 
stages in the European integration process in a climate of a broad political consensus, in 
Hungary the politicization of European matters contributed to institutional and procedural 
shifts under several governments. While the dominant role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
significantly characterized the management process, Ágh and Rózsás (2003: 22) stressed 
that in the early 1990s the management of EU business was ‘two centered’ involving the 
Office of European Affairs in the Ministry of Industry and Trade as well as the European 
Union Department of the Foreign Ministry. The division of labor was defined by the 
responsibility of the Office of European Affairs for European issues related to trade, 
economics, legislation and assistance programs and the Foreign Ministry’s care of diplomatic 
                                                 
12 Marcel Koprol, former diplomatic Head of the Mission of the Republic of Slovenia in Brussels, was 
named Head of the Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for European Affairs within 
the Prime Minister's cabinet on 14 December 2004  
(http://www.gov.si/svez/1_predstavitev/0_sekretar_slo.php, accessed on 22 December 2004).   16
and political relations with the EU. Due to growing rivalry between the two institutions the 
management of EU business was not optimum.
13 
 
When a detailed Commission questionnaire had to be answered the domestic system had to 
adapt to the need of supplying and collation of the information required from all ministries. In 
this situation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the key co-ordinator although the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry remained in the inner circle of the executive’s involvement in 
managing EU affairs. In February 1996 the European Integration Agreement Cabinet, 
composed of the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Economy and Finance, 
chaired by the Prime Minister, was established. A Strategic Task Force on Integration in the 
framework of the Prime Minister’s Office was established to give advice to the Integration 
Cabinet. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the State Secretariat for Integration (SSI) was 
established in 1996. While the European Integration Cabinet briefed Prime Minister Horn on 
EU issues which could not be solved at lower levels, the State Secretariat for Integration took 
care of the central administrative and co-ordinating functions (formerly dealt with by the 
former Office of European Affairs and the European Union Department (Ágh and Rózsás, 
2003: 23). For cross-sectoral policy co-ordination the Interministerial Committee for 
European Integration (ICEI) was established. These structures were later altered by the 
Orbán and Medgyessy governments. 
 
Changes in Hungarian governments (beside the changing circumstances and challenges of 
specific stages in the European integration process) brought about variations in: a) 
involvement by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Prime Minister in managing European 
Affairs; b) government policy on Europe; and, at least recently c) in the level of politization of 
European matters.  
 
Under the Horn government (1994-1998) the State Secretariat for Integration in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs played the principle co-ordinating role. At the same time, the Integration 
Cabinet of the Prime Minister facilitated the significant involvement of the Prime Minister and 
a select set of governmental institutions and cadre.  
 
The Orbán government (1998-2002) abolished both the Integration Cabinet and Task Force 
and established a Department of European Integration in the Prime Minister’s Office together 
with a special new section in the PM’s Office (headed by a minister without portfolio). Ágh 
and Rózsás (2003: 31) stressed that the Orbán government’s majoritarian approach created 
                                                 
13 Estimation by Ágh and Rózsás (2003: 22) on the basis of research by Krisztina Vida (published in 
2002).   17
an administrative institutional dualism between the Centre of Government and the State 
Secretariat for Integration. The authors also estimated that, due to the absence of the 
Integration Cabinet during Orbán’s term, the government’s role in taking the final EU policy 
decision was only limited to the Prime Minister’s decisions in exceptional circumstances. 
 
In order to acquire a more direct role in managing the EU process, the Medgyessy 
government (2002-) enhanced the role of the Prime Minister and his office. In that way the 
political and administrative dualism seen in the Orbán times was abolished. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the State Secretariat for Integration and External Economic Relations are 
still involved in the core process of managing EU affairs, albeit not exclusively. 
 
The late stage of the accession process (the period after 2002) brought about new demands 
in the management of EU business. Structures and processes need to be adapted to full EU 
membership. 
 
Estonia 
 
In 1995 when Estonia became the first post-communist country with the status of associate 
member without any transition period, a special EU unit (the Group of the European Union) 
was established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of European Affairs without 
portfolio was created. Due to ‘the growing pressures on legal harmonization and problems in 
the functioning of the co-ordination structure’ (Drechsler et al., 2003: 3) it was the Prime 
Minister who took over managing EU matters. The Estonian Negotiation Delegation involved 
representatives of each ministry (except the Ministry of Defense), the Office for European 
Integration, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Estonian Mission to the EU (based in 
Brussels). Thirty-three negotiation working groups prepared analyses which formed the basis 
for shaping the negotiating positions of the main delegation. It was the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (the Chief Negotiator) who presented negotiating positions to the government and 
later also consulted the Parliament.  
 
Since the dual internal structures in preparations for joining the EU and for negotiations with 
the EU occasionally created difficulties these had to be resolved. On the basis of empirical 
research, Drechsler et al. (2003: 8) estimate there has been a clear shift towards a co-
ordination model centered on the Prime Minister since 2002 (starting with the new Kallas 
government in the same year). The 2003 government reform identified the Prime Minister as 
the centre of co-ordination while maintaining the decentralized system of individual 
ministries.   18
 
2.4 Public Administration Styles 
 
Slovenia  
 
One of the most useful indicators of EU demands on particular domestic departments for the 
candidate countries was the contents of separate (each and every one of 31) negotiating 
chapters, which reflected the salience of the EU in a particular policy area. In Slovenia, the 
government appointed 31 working groups in line with the various negotiating chapters, 
comprising representatives of individual ministries and other relevant institutions. The 
working groups were responsible, together with the negotiating team and if necessary 
external experts and independent institutions, for preparing negotiating positions and other 
platforms for negotiations on a particular chapter. The head of a working group was usually a 
higher official (i.e. state secretary) of a ministry or other government institution that was 
responsible for the chapter in question.
14 
 
                                                 
14 The preparation of a negotiating position started within the relevant Working Group. The Working 
Group first prepared a draft negotiating position based on the results of multilateral and bilateral 
screenings and the current situation in an individual negotiating chapter. Even in this initial phase of 
preparation, external experts and institutions were invited to take part in preparing the draft negotiating 
position by providing their opinions and positions on a particular substantive area. Because the main 
responsibility for preparing a negotiating position remained with the line ministries, the minister 
responsible for an individual area confirmed the draft negotiating position. After that confirmation, 
pressure groups also became involved in shaping the negotiating position by submitting their opinions 
and proposals.  
On the proposal of the relevant minister, the draft negotiating position was then submitted to the 
Negotiating Team. Representatives of the relevant Working Group and the Negotiating Team then 
prepared the proposed negotiating position together based on several working meetings and other 
(including informal) forms of co-operation (usually about five meetings and several discussions, 
depending on the chapter’s complexity). The Head of the Negotiating Team, a member of the 
Negotiating Team responsible for the given chapter, and the editing group of the Department for 
Negotiations within the Government Office for European Affairs participated in editing the negotiating 
position. External experts from individual fields were again invited to co-operate in this phase. If the 
drafting of a proposed negotiating position required inter-ministerial co-ordination, the Prime Minister 
mediated and convened a ‘European Meeting’ of the Government for all ministers concerned. At this 
point, the Mission of the Republic of Slovenia made another important contribution to the negotiating 
position by providing substantive as well as editorial comments on the negotiating position.  
The proposed negotiating position was then discussed by two government committees: the Committee 
for Economic Affairs and the Committee for State Administration and Public Affairs. After being 
adopted by the Government, the negotiating positions were presented to non-governmental 
organizations and trade union representatives. After this, the Government submitted the negotiating 
position to the National Assembly where it was discussed by the relevant working bodies and 
eventually approved by the Committee on Foreign Policy. This verification only followed the translation 
of the negotiating position into English, prepared within the Department for Negotiations or the 
Translation Unit of the Government Office for European Affairs. Therefore, the negotiating positions 
were packed and prepared for their ‘journey’ to Brussels. The Negotiating Team and the Government 
Office for European Affairs then submitted through the Slovenian Mission in Brussels the English 
version of the negotiating positions to the Council. 
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The composition of individual working groups reflected the complexity of the Europeanization 
process. It is true that some working groups were more or less completely sectorally 
composed, but in fact they were mainly inter-sectoral. Moreover, in some of them almost all 
ministries were included. The analysis of the composition of these working groups shows that 
besides the national ‘core-core’ and ‘first inner core’ executive the greatest levels of 
Europeanization can also be found in the so-called ‘second inner core’ executive, namely: 1) 
the Ministry of the Economy; 2) the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food; and 3) the 
Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning.  
 
So as to intensify the efficiency of intra-departmental co-ordination, in October 1995 the 
Government of the Republic of Slovenia obliged all ministries and other governmental 
institutions to establish special units within particular departments for handling European 
business. As a result, some ministries established new so-called ‘EU Units’, while others just 
added some additional duties to units already existing within their departments. These ‘EU 
Units’ differ essentially by status, name, size and responsibilities. While some have 
altogether merely technical or co-ordination functions, others also have quite substantive 
functions. Some thus have the status of a full and completely independent directorate, 
whereas others merely have some small divisions or even only one employed official for co-
ordinating EU matters. In some departments they even recently abolished such ‘EU Units’. 
Therefore, today in Slovenia not all ministries have special units for handling EU matters.  
 
In the complicated web of institutions and roles, the informal contacts in vertical and 
horizontal communications have significantly rectified the (somewhat) rigid and inefficient 
formal channels and ways of communicating. Due to the challenge of managing European 
matters new ways of work in the public administration have developed – more co-ordination 
and team-work. Due to a strategy of adding European business to the existing tasks of 
officials the ‘internalization’ of EU affairs has prevailed over the creation of a special EU-
knowledgeable elite. 
 
Hungary 
 
 
It is interesting that the administrative structures established in 1996 for managing EU 
business in Hungary have largely remained stable, although their operation has been 
influenced by both the various steps in the accession process which demanded ever more 
comprehensive institutional structures during the 1990s and by the styles of the various 
governments (Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 21). The critical junction was the European Agreement 
which stimulated the establishment of three institutions (the Association Council, the   20
Association Committee and the Joint Parliamentary Committee).
15 During implementation of 
the Europe Agreement a variety of working bodies was set up in line with specific chapters 
and obligations in the Agreement. 
 
The formal engagement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been unique in comparison to 
other segments of the Hungarian public administration. Despite the fact that Hungary’s public 
administration is based on a continental tradition involving institutionalization and 
formalization, the EU part of the administration has developed processes and procedures 
which differ from a general national administration pattern (Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 36).
16  
 
In the central public administration ‘an EU elite’ of civil servants was created. This was 
possible in circumstances where no radical change in the government brought about 
changes in the group of civil servants working on EU issues or among diplomatic staff in 
Hungary’s Mission to the European Union, including the Mission’s head. In addition, the 
ministerial attachés were assigned to their posts for longer than six years – contrary to the 
normal diplomatic service of four- to five-year posts. The EU managing elite developed into 
an island of (better paid) expertise, continuity and well developed personal contacts in 
circumstances of frequent changes in government. The EU part of the public administration 
became so specific that Nunberg (quoted by Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 40) described that split 
as a ‘deep fragmentation’ of the Hungarian public administration. 
 
Negotiations mostly took place in informal meetings with the European Commission’s 
Services, ambassadors and staff members of the permanent representations of member 
states. The Chief Negotiator prepared proposals for the government (additionally informed 
via his personal contacts with his counterparts in Brussels) on the basis of his assessment of 
the specific situation (Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 36). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 The Association Council, the Association Committee and the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Ágh 
and Rózsás, 2003: 21–2) 
16 The authors stress that the continental tradition was weakened during the transition to a democracy 
and market economy but there is some evidence of its re-emergence in a later (more stable) period. 
Vass (2000: 230) warns that far too rigid hierarchy and the organization of Hungarian public 
administration must be eased and that it should also be aware of dangers when introducing new public 
management approaces. Vass (2000: 228) quotes the OECD newsletter (The Public Management 
Forum) “the introduction of public management innovations based on new public management theory, 
applied in particular in English speaking OECD countries, has led to a decrease in levels of 
coordination”.   21
Estonia 
 
The key characteristics of the Estonian public administration (a newly evolving public 
administration of a small state) have been its limited size, the personalization of roles and 
information pathways (Drechsler et al., 2003: 13, 17). Researchers do not agree on whether 
this is simply a transitional feature of a developing state or whether it is to remain a 
permanent characteristic of the small state. Still, general decentralization seems to remain an 
important feature of the Estonian public administration after the March 2003 reform.
17 
 
According to the quoted research (Drechsler et al., 2003: 12) European issues are often 
handled in Estonia in line with the regular order and usual hierarchies as established in the 
ministries. Even when taking into account difficulties in broad horizontal co-ordination among 
ministries the opinion so far prevails that there is no need for the further formalization of 
procedures. What has instead been discovered is that the accession process helped better 
introduce a co-ordination culture into the Estonian civil service. Still the organization’s 
problem of significant unrecorded information loss remains due to the personalization of the 
predominantly informal process. 
 
After 1996 Estonian domestic structures started their institutional adaptation. Since co-
ordinating functions were divided between the State Chancellery (involving the Office of 
European Integration, the Council of Senior Civil Servants, the European Union Information 
Secretariat) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (involving the Under-Secretary for European 
Integration, the Department of European Integration, the Estonian Mission to the EU) a dual 
structure for managing EU matters evolved. 
 
Since nearly all ministries took part in the negotiating process in some way, almost all civil 
servants in every central government institution (ministries, agencies, boards, inspectorates 
etc.) were involved in EU matters to a certain extent. For the intermediation and exchange of 
information between ministers, the Council of Senior Civil Servants (CSCS) was established 
in 1996 and developed into the main forum for the horizontal management of EU issues – on 
1 March 2003 it was officially renamed the Interministerial Co-ordination Council.  
 
During the negotiating stage the management of EU affairs involving strong ministries 
responsible for harmonization of the law led to extensive decentralization (Drechsler et al., 
                                                 
17 Viks and Randma-Liiv 2003 (quoted by Drechsler et al., 2003: 15–6) even stress that ‘currently 
there is no centre competence for the civil service which would have the capacity for disseminating 
know-how and developing the general rules and guidelines needed in a decentralized system’.   22
2003: 5). On the basis of a 1996 Government order all ministries were obliged to establish 
special units or indicate a special person responsible for EU business. Only recently (in 2001 
and 2002 according to interview findings presented in Drechsler et al., 2003: 11) has it been 
recognized at the ministerial level that EU matters should be part of the everyday work of 
most ministerial officials. 
 
On the whole, Estonia has combined a decentralized and elitist approach to managing EU 
business. While it has avoided the potentially problematic emergence of ‘islands of 
excellence’ dealing with the EU it is still possible to recognize the positions of a group of key 
personnel within EU-related co-ordination structures, which have been surprisingly stable – a 
phenomenon atypical for Estonia (according to research by Viks and Randma-Liiv, 2003, as 
quoted by Drechsler et al., 2003: 14). In addition, Estonia still faces the problem of strategic 
planning within ministries and a lack of co-ordination (Drechsler et al., 2003: 11 quoting the 
2003 SIGMA report on Estonia). This last shortfall has even been described as the main 
problem of the Estonian civil service by both the European Commission and the OECD 
(Drechsler et al., 2003: 15–6).  
 
2.5 Transparency: the roles of parliament and civil society 
 
Slovenia 
 
One of Slovenia’s distinctive features is its commitment to the principle of full transparency in 
integration with the EU. The publication of all negotiating positions, the important role of the 
Parliament and participation of civil society characterized Slovenia’s negotiating style. It is a 
commonly accepted belief
18 and overall assessment that the Slovenian national 
management of EU business was not only extremely transparent but also relatively effective. 
 
Slovenia is quite special compared to other candidate states with its stress on Parliament’s 
role in managing EU affairs. Namely, the new Slovenian political system based on a 
parliamentary constitutional spirit also remained crucial in the otherwise pragmatic 
institutional adaptation to Europeanization. The discussion and approval of negotiating 
positions by the National Assembly also made the process transparent in terms of the control 
and (co)decisions of legislative power in relation to the executive.  
 
                                                 
18 Perception held by interviewees (Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2003).   23
As a result of the political elite’s broad consensus,
19 to some extent the process of 
Europeanization has also provided Slovenia’s political system with a completely new value: 
the excellent circulation of information and overall relationship with regard to EU accession 
between the executive and the National Assembly’s working bodies. These assessments 
only involve co-ordination matters and not contents (for example, the quality of bills proposed 
by the government). But this is still a real curiosity for the Slovenian system since 
relationships and especially information flows between the National Assembly and executive 
have often otherwise been described as unsatisfactory.  
 
Although the Europeanization process can be seen as elite-led (involving co-operation 
between parties in government and oppositional parties) in Slovenia it also involved civil 
society. Even in the negotiating structures, the Slovenian corporatist tradition is visible.
20 
Besides the presence of experts and representatives of employers and employees in 31 
working groups, we can talk about the practical role of civil society in preparing the 
negotiating positions. This was also possible due to public presentations of the negotiating 
positions (special presentations to specific interested publics, target groups – such as non-
governmental organizations and full presentations on the Internet), which opened up extra 
opportunities for civil society activities.  
 
Hungary 
 
Even though Hungary was the first Central European post-socialist country to establish a 
Parliamentary Committee on European Community Affairs in 1992 (Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 
40) this symbolic political move did not evolve into an important practical role for the 
Hungarian parliament in managing EU affairs. Due to the broad support of parliamentary 
parties for integration with the EU, EU matters were mainly discussed in a ‘technical’ and 
apolitical way.
21 Ágh (1999: 840) estimated that government proposals passed through 
parliament with relative ease. 
                                                 
19 Besides that, integration with the EU has been seen as a common political (governmental and 
oppositional) task of elites. In these circumstances, the Slovenian government recognized the 
relatively great importance of involving the National Assembly in European affairs. This is why the 
Slovenian parliament has had a unique and very important role in European affairs compared to other 
parliaments in candidate countries. It follows EU business closely and exerts quite a large influence on 
the Slovenian government.  
20 The corporatist tradition in Slovenian territory has long roots, starting already in the times of the 
Habsburg Empire. It even persisted in institutional arrangements of »the political system of self-
managing socialism« and was revived in the political system established on the basis of the 1991 
Constitution.  
21 Ágh and Rózsás (2003: 42–3) warn that recent opposition (Orbán’s) criticism of the EU and 
negative consequences of EU membership could put pressure on the Medgyessy government (with its 
small majority in parliament) to develop a more consensual approach in order to ensure enough   24
 
The second parliament (after the 1994 elections) replaced the Parliamentary Committee on 
European Community Affairs with the Committee on European Integration Affairs which 
examined Hungary’s relations with the EU and monitored implementation of the Association 
Agreement as well as preparations for full membership. Ágh and Rózsás (2003: 40) revealed 
that even the special parliamentary Committee on European Integration Affairs lacked the 
interest, expertise, language knowledge and financial resources for an effective role. Further, 
it was also one of the least influential standing committees in the parliament (Ágh, 1999). 
 
Written negotiating positions were approved by the government. Since the Orbán 
government was eager to complete the accession negotiations as quickly as possible, 
requests for derogations were kept to a minimum. Despite the fact that EU accession was 
broadly publicly supported (including sectoral interests) there was criticism of the absence of 
representation of the various interests and territorial actors in the process of managing EU 
issues. By 2001 criticism of the results of negotiations also emerged. The limited role of 
parliament added to the problematic lack of communication channels for organized interests 
(Ágh, 1999). Although the second parliament (1998-2002) allowed co-operation with civil 
society and opened the possibility for other MPs and party leaders to participate in the 
Committee for European Integration Affairs, this practice has not developed due to a lack of 
formal rules on participation. It was not before 2002 that the parliament succeeded in 
achieving a consensus to establish the Grand Committee on European Integration composed 
of the leaders of all parliamentary parties, the chairs of relevant parliamentary committees 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 41). The division of labor 
between the Grand Committee and the Committee for European Integration Affairs lies in 
splitting strategic decisions on EU matters (the Grand Committee) from the monitoring and 
implementation of the European Agreement and harmonization of legislation. 
 
Estonia 
 
Like in Hungary the Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) mostly only accepted and 
‘rubberstamped’ the accession policy defined by the government (Drechsler et al., 2003: 8). 
Among the Riigikogu’s adaptations of Estonian integration with the EU the creation of the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee of the European Union is also mentioned together with the 
parliamentary European Affairs Committee. Some influence was exerted by the 
                                                                                                                                                          
parliamentary support for certain remaining legislation, which can only be passed by a two-thirds 
majority. In this way EU matters have become more politicized since the 2002 change in government.   25
parliamentary Rural Affairs Committee and the Finance Committee on certain opinions of the 
European Affairs Committee.  
 
In the end it was the government which, after informing the parliament, decided on the 
nation’s negotiating position. A more recent adaptation of the executive has reinforced the 
concentration of power in the ministries, which not only produces more difficulties in 
horizontal co-ordination but has also further weakened the already very weak role of the 
parliament (Drechsler et al., 2003: 17). 
 
The managing of European matters has not been very transparent in Estonia. Drechsler et 
al. (2003: 13) stressed that quite often the public was not even informed of negotiating 
positions until the closing of specific negotiating chapters. In fact, official information on the 
negotiating positions was confidential! Like in Hungary, in Estonia the strong concentration of 
the management of EU matters in the executive also exacerbated the weaknesses of the 
democratic process. 
 
Official Estonian priorisation of EU matters within the core executive was also not matched 
by the widespread engagement of non-governmental organizations in Estonia (Drechsler et 
al., 2003: 14). Even after the establishment of a special consultative body (the Foreign 
Minister’s Consultative Committee) in November 1999 for interest groups’ and citizens’ 
participation their involvement in preparations for EU integration did not increase 
significantly. With the exception of some interest groups which recognized their interests and 
had both the resources and opportunities to influence the decision-making process, other 
interest groups and the wider public remained disengaged. Drechsler et al. (2003: 15) warn 
that in the post-membership period this cannot be sustained because ‘successful 
engagement with the EU relies not only on core-executive management but also on the 
ability of domestic economies and societies to live with the EU following membership’. Still, 
the problem of civil society’s engagement in managing EU affairs is not peculiar to just these 
issues. Viks and Randma-Liiv, 2003 (quoted in Drechsler et al., 2003: 16–7) stress that there 
is almost no tradition in the democratic process.  
 
3 COMPARISONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
 
3.1 The importance of an interdisciplinary and dynamic approach to the research 
 
Our preliminary research has tried to combine political science approaches with some insight 
into the public administration aspects of political systems. The first impression is that this   26
combination of research approaches may be fruitful for research on political system 
adaptations to the challenges of external Europeanization pressures. 
 
As we have shown, the institutional and procedural adaptations to the Europeanization 
processes in the three investigated countries have so far differed significantly although a 
tendency of a Prime Minister-led model is obvious in all of them. Research into these 
systemic adaptations obviously cannot ignore the viable dynamism in the area of research. 
Institutional and administrative structures created in the process of the accession 
negotiations are now the starting points for the adaptation of new member states to full EU-
membership – a shift from policy-taking to policy-making.  
 
Despite the many similarities between the three investigated EU newcomer/new member 
states’ characteristics of their national administrations, these adaptations vary to an 
important extent. Such variations cannot be explained by simply taking into account the 
general experience of transition to a democracy which has quite often been described by a 
stereotyped socialist past and simultaneous reforms in many social sub-systems. So what 
are the dissimilarities and possible explanations of the very different paths taken in 
adaptation of the national core executive and administrations (given the similarities between 
the three countries sharing multiple transitions, parliamentary constitutional choice, a 
relatively high level of wealth, very similar and mostly positive evaluations by the 
Commission when assessing satisfaction of the accession criteria as well as recent claims 
that they have become consolidated democracies)? 
 
3.2 The role of national administration traditions and cultures 
 
According to the preliminary research findings it seems there is some correlation between a 
public administration tradition on one hand and the public administration adaptation mode as 
well as European co-ordination style in individual countries on the other (Table 5). Both of 
these also seem to correlate with the (non)existence of a special, relatively isolated EU-elite 
within the national public administration. 
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Table 5: Consultation and co-ordination processes when dealing with EU matters  
  Public 
administration 
tradition 
Public 
administration 
adaptation 
Creation of EU-elite 
within PA 
Co-ordination style  
(Laffan, 2004) 
Slovenia  continental 
(Germanic 
influences) 
general 
internalization 
of European affairs 
dispersion 
of expertise 
and communication 
growing centralization/ 
formalization combined with 
socialization 
Hungary   weakened 
continental 
fragmentation 
 (island of 
excellence) 
 
elite group of EU officials  centralization/ 
socialization 
Estonia  small size 
decentralized 
segmentation 
(strong ministries) 
lacking horizontal 
coordination 
person-centered expertise 
and communication 
decentralization/ 
socialization 
 
Although it seems that the special features of national administration traditions and cultures 
do influence institutional adaptation (institutional organization, procedures and agents), they 
do not fully explain the adaptation to Europeanization processes. For example, Drechsler et 
al. (2004) stress that dealing with European issues as a political priority obtained a very 
special status and characteristics in Estonia. Atypically for Estonia, the positions of key 
personnel within the EU-related co-ordination structures have been surprisingly stable while 
the accession process has no doubt helped to introduce more of a co-ordination culture into 
the Estonian civil service (ibidem, p. 14). Similarly, political consensus on European 
integration in Slovenia depoliticized the area of dealing with European matters – unlike other 
fields of administration and politics/policies (Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2003). Still, only in 
Hungary was an island of EU experts created in circumstances where, for all three countries, 
European integration was a national political priority. 
 
3.3 The role of recent historical experience of managing political and policy issues in 
the framework of a multinational (con)federal state 
 
We believe that the recent historical experience of managing political and policy issues in the 
framework of a multinational (con)federal state may provide a know-how basis for possible 
use within the European supranational political system. Unfortunately, at this stage of our 
research we are unable to more closely empirically test the hypothesis that Slovenia’s 
idiosyncratic experiences of pursuing national interests within the confederal socialist 
Yugoslavia (especially experiences from the 1980s) helped it in its comparatively quick and 
integral adaptation of the executive and public administration to new European challenges. 
 
3.4 Political shifts in governments as an explanatory variable 
  
In addition to national administrative and political cultural traditions perhaps the political shifts 
seen in the various governments also reflect specific ways of adapting to new challenges   28
when managing EU matters. Hungary is an interesting case in point. It has developed an 
‘island’ of a special, politically ‘untouchable’ elite within the executive and public 
administration pursuing the national priority of quick accession to the EU. In the two other 
countries the relative stability of ideologically similar and for nearly all the time the same PM-
led governments seem to have allowed more clear-cut expressions of public administration 
traditions when managing EU affairs. 
 
Table 6: Political changes in governments and selected characteristics of managing EU 
affairs in Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary 
  Political-elite 
change 
Core management 
of EU affairs* 
Mode of co-ordination  New institutionalization versus  
new administrative culture 
Slovenia  long-term, 
centre-left-led 
coalition 
governments 
Prime Minister-led  centralization  general development of  
co-ordination procedures and culture 
Hungary  left/right change in 
government 
Foreign Ministry-led 
with a recent 
tendency to Prime 
Minister- led 
concentration into an 
island of Europeanization 
predominant development of  
isolated coordination culture 
Estonia  long-term, 
centre-right coalition 
governments 
Prime Minister-led  maintaining a  
decentralized 
mode 
development of segmented  
co-ordination culture 
* based on a typology by Laffan (2003: 8–9) and country reports within the European project Organizing for 
Enlargement 
 
 
3.5 Political cultural traditions matter 
 
Political culture traditions seem to be quite an important factor in political elites’ decisions on 
opening up EU negotiating and accession matters for public discussion. When looking at the 
selected countries it is especially corporatist traditions (which in Slovenia survived even 
within the ‘political system of socialist self-management’) that appear to make an important 
difference. 
 
Table 7: Consultation and co-ordination processes in dealing with EU matters  
  Tradition of  
consultative 
politics 
Civil society 
Engagement? 
Formally and  
practically  
recognized  
role of  
Parliament? 
Publicly  
available 
information? 
Mode of  
co-ordination 
Co-ordination  
style  
Slovenia  relatively  
strong 
yes yes yes  horizontal  and 
vertical 
coordination 
formalization/  
amended by  
informal 
communication 
Hungary   relatively 
weak 
no no no  fragmentation 
(island of 
excellence) 
 
centralization/ 
socialization within  
the island of 
excellence 
Estonia  relatively 
weak 
no no no  vertical 
centralization, 
lack of horizontal 
coordination 
decentralization/ 
socialization 
* based on a typology by Laffan (2003) and country reports within the European project Organizing for 
Enlargement   29
  
3.6 How to explain variations in the roles of parliaments? 
 
There is no clear evidence that constitutional choice leads to the development of similar 
institutional solutions and practices in managing European matters. This is true even when 
looking at the role of parliament in all three countries otherwise defined as parliamentary 
democracies. Only Slovenia has so far provided an exception to the pattern of the weak roles 
of national parliaments. Grabbe (2002: 1017) warns that although the lack of debate in most 
CEE legislatures reflects a consensus on accession, it also shows a lack of awareness of the 
details of the legislation being passed by parliamentarians – indirectly she sees this 
phenomenon as a danger of exporting aspects of the EU’s own democratic deficit to CEE 
through the accession process.  
 
Based on our preliminary research we are unable to move beyond the description and offer 
some viable explanations of the cases included in the research. Especially when we note 
that Slovenia looked at the models of Scandinavian countries (in order to adapt to its full EU 
membership Slovenia recently legally adopted a model which is very close to the Finnish 
one) and Estonia’s divergence from these despite its geographical closeness and many 
social links to that area, we find it very difficult to explain the differences between countries at 
this stage of the research. 
 
3.7 Some concluding remarks 
 
It seems that Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia have developed into ‘multi-level players’ of 
several kinds and with various resources for an efficient policy-making (instead of ‘policy-
taking’) role.  
 
Currently, they are all facing the same stage of adaptation – involvement in day-to-day 
participation in common European policy-making. Slovenia seems to be sticking to its 
gradualist mode of adaptation. It remains to be seen whether all three countries will maintain 
this strategy or whether any will opt for a more radical one. The latter alternative is 
particularly interesting for Hungary which has so far only adapted islands of its executive and 
public administration to any important extent. Due to constant problems of horizontal co-
ordination, Estonia might also reconsider its model in line with its interests to efficiently 
participate in European policy-making.  
 
   30
REFERENCES 
 
Ágh,  A. (1996), ‘Meso-politics in Central Europe: Fighting with the Infantile Disease in 
Europeanization and Democratization’, in A. Ágh et al., Parliaments and Organized Interests: 
The Second Steps, Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, pp. 241–52. 
 
Ágh,  A. (1999), ‘Europeanization of policy-making in East Central Europe: The Hungarian 
Approach to EU Accession’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 5, pp. 839–54. 
 
Ágh, A. (2003), Anticipatory and Adaptive Europeanization in Hungary, Budapest: Hungarian 
Centre for Democracy Studies. 
 
Ágh,  A., and Á. Rózsás (2003), ‘Managing Europe from Home. The Europeanization of the 
Hungarian Core Executive’, OEUE Occassional Paper 5.1 – 09.03, 
http://www.oeue.net/papers.asp, 6.1.2005. 
 
Bailey, I. (2002), ‘National Adaptation to European Integration: Institutional Vetoes and 
Goodnes-of-fit’,  Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 791–811. 
 
Börzel, A. T. (1997), ‘What’s So Special About Policy Networks? An Exploration of the 
Concept and Its Usefulness in Studying European Governance’, European Integration online 
Papers (EioP), Vol. 1, No. 16. 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-016a.htm>  
 
Brusis, M., and V. Dimitrov (2001), ‘Executive Configuration and Fiscal Performance in Post-
communist Central and Eastern Europe’, in K. H. Goetz, ed., Executive Governance in 
Central and Eastern Europe, special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, 
No. 6, pp. 888–910. 
 
Bulmer, S. (1983), ‘Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-making’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 21, pp. 229–63. 
 
Bulmer, S. (1986), The Domestic Structure of European Community Policy-making in West 
Germany, New York: Garland. 
 
Bulmer, S., and M. Burch (1998), ‘Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and 
European Union’, Public Administration, Vol. 76, No. 4, pp. 601–28.   31
 
Bulmer, S., and M. Burch (2001), ‘The “Europeanization” of Central Government: The UK 
and Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective’, in G. Schneider and M. Aspinwall, 
eds.,  The Rules of Integration. Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe, 
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, pp. 73–96. 
 
Dimitrakopoulus, D., and J. Richardson (2001), ‘Implementing EU Public Policy’, in J. 
Richardson, ed., European Union: Power and Policy-making, London: Routledge, pp. 335–
56. 
 
Drechsler, W., R. Kattel, M. Kompus-van der Hoeven, K. Kallas, and Saarniit (2004), 
‘Managing Europe from Home. The Europeanization of the Estonian Core Executive’, OEUE 
PHASE I Occasional Paper 2.1 – 09.03, http://www.oeue.net/papers.asp, 6.1.2005. 
 
Drechsler, W. (2004), ‘Governance, good governance, and government: The Case for 
Estonian Administrative Capacity', Trames. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences,   
Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 388–418. 
 
Featherstone, K., and G. Kazamias, eds. (2001), Europeanization and the Southern 
Periphery, London and Portland OR: Frank Cass. 
 
Fink Hafner, D. (1999), ‘Dilemmas in Managing the Expanding EU: The EU and Applicant 
States’ Points of View', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 5, pp. 783–801. 
 
Fink Hafner, D. (2002), ‘Between Continuity and Change: The Building of the Slovenian Party 
Arena View', in N. Toš and V. Miheljak, eds., Slovenia Between Continuity and Change, 
1990-1997, Berlin: Sigma, pp. 42–66. 
 
Fink Hafner, D. (2004), ‘Slovenia: From a Mix of Polarized and Moderate Pluralism to a 
Predominant Party System (and Back?)', paper presented at the conference on ‘The 
Heterogeneous European Union Parties and the Party System in New Member States’, 
Centre for European Studies at the University of Helsinki, 17-18 September 2004. 
 
Fink Hafner, D., and D. Lajh (2003), Managing Europe From Home: The Europeanization of 
the Slovenian Core Executive, Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences. 
   32
Goetz, H. K. (2001), 'European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of an 
Effect?', in K. H. Goetz and S. Hix, eds., Europeanized politics? European Integration and 
National Political Systems, London and Portland: Frank Cass, pp. 211–31. 
 
Goetz, H. K. and H. Wollmann (2001), 'Governmentalizing Central Executives in Post-
comunist Europe: A Four-country Comparison', in K. H. Goetz, ed., Executive Governance in 
Central and Eastern Europe, special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, 
No. 6, pp. 864–87. 
 
Goetz, H. K., ed. (2001), Executive Governance in Central and Eastern Europe, special issue 
of the Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 6, pp. 863–1051. 
 
Goetz, H. K., and S. Hix, eds. (2001), Europeanized politics? European Integration and 
National Political Systems, London and Portland: Frank Cass. 
 
Goetz, H. K. (2003), Executives in Comparative Context, in J. Hayward and A. Menon, eds., 
Governing Europe, Oxford University Press, pp. 74–91. 
 
Grabbe H. (2001), 'How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, 
Diffusion and Diversity', in K. H. Goetz, ed., Executive Governance in Central and Eastern 
Europe, special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 6, pp. 1013–1031. 
 
Hall, P., and R. Taylor (1996), ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, 
Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp. 936–57. 
 
Hanf, K., and B. Soetendorp (1998), Adapting to European Integration. Small States and the 
European Union, London, New York: Longman. 
 
Harmsen, H. R. (1999), 'The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative 
Study of France and the Netherlands’, Governanace, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp, 81–113. 
 
Hix, S., and K. H. Goetz (2001), 'Introduction: European Integration and National Political 
Systems', in K. H. Goetz and S. Hix, eds., Europeanized politics? European Integration and 
National Political Systems, London, Portland: Frank Cass. 
   33
Josselin, D. (1996), ‘Domestic Policy Networks and European Negotiations: Evidence from 
British and Fench Financial Services’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 
297–317. 
 
Kaldor, M., and I. Vejvoda (1999), 'Democratization in Central and East European Countries: 
An Overview', in M. Kaldor and I. Vejvoda, eds., Democratization in Central and Eastern 
Europe, London and New York: Pinter, pp. 1–24. 
 
Kaldor, M., and I. Vejvoda, eds. (1999), Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, 
London and New York: Pinter. 
 
Kassim, H. (2000), 'Conclusion. The National Co-Ordination of EU Policy: Confronting the 
Challenge', in H. Kassim, G. B. Peters and V. Wright, eds., The National Co-ordination of EU 
Policy.The Domestic Level, UK and USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 235–64. 
 
Knill, C. (2001), The Europeanisation of National Administrations, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Laffan, B. et. al. (2000), 'Organising for EU Enlargement: A Challenge for the Member States 
and Candidate Countries', Research design for an EU's Fifth Framework Programme project 
(project was approved for the period 2001-2004: HPSE-CT-2001-00083). 
 
Laffan, B. (2001a), 'The European Union Polity: A Union of Regulative, Normative and 
Cognitive Pillars', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 709–27.    
 
Laffan, B. (2001b), Organizing for a Changing Europe: Irish Central Government and the 
European Union, Studies in Public Policy: 7, Dublin: The Policy Institute at Trinity College. 
 
Laffan, B. (2003), ‘Managing Europe from Home. Impact of the EU on Executive 
Government. A Comparative Analysis’, OEUE PHASE I Occasional Paper 0.1 – 09.03, 
http://www.oeue.net/papers.asp, 6.1.2005. 
 
Lajh, D., and D. Fink-Hafner (2002), ‘Institucionalno prilagajanje slovenske izvršne oblasti 
povezovanju Slovenije z ES/EU: mednarodno primerjalni pogled’, Teorija in praksa, Vol. 39, 
No. 6, pp. 970–99. 
   34
Lippert, B., G. Umbach, and W. Wessels (2001), ‘Europeanization of CEE Executives: EU 
Membership Negotiations as a Shaping Power’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, 
No. 6, pp. 980–1012. 
 
Mazey, S. and J. Richardson (2002), ‘EU Policy-making: A Garbage Can or an Anticipatory 
and Consensual Policy Style?’, in Y. Mény, P. Muller, and J. Quermonne (eds.), Adjusting to 
Europe. The Impact of the European Union on national Institutions and Policies, London and 
New York: Routledge, pp. 41–58. 
 
Mikkel, E. (2004), ‘Patterns of Party Formation in Estonia: Consolidation Unaccomplished’, 
paper presented at the conference on ‘The Heterogeneous European Union Parties and the 
Party System in New Member States’, Centre for European Studies at the University of 
Helsinki, 17-18 September 2004. 
 
Olsen, J. P. (2002), ‘Towards a European Adminstrative Space?’, Arena Working Papers, 
WP 02/26, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_26.htm, 11 August 2004. 
 
Page, C. E. (2003), Europeanization and the Persistence of Administrative Systems, in: J. 
Hayward, Jack and Menon, Anand, eds. Governing Europe, Oxford University Press, pp. 
162-177 
 
Peterson, J. (1995), ‘Decision-Making in the European Union: Towards a Framework for 
Analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 69–93. 
 
Polak, K. (2000), Lobiranje v Evropski uniji kot instrument uveljavljanja nacionalnih interesov 
Slovenije, diploma thesis, Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences. 
 
Potočnik, J. (2000), ‘Preface’, in Ž. Mejač, ed., Negotiating Positions of the Republic of 
Slovenia for Negotiations on Accession to the European Union, Ljubljana: The Government 
Office for European Affairs. 
 
Putnam, D. R. (1988), ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games’, 
International Organisation, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427–60.  
 
Radaelli, M. C. (2000), ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive 
Change’, European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 4, No. 8. 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>   35
 
Ramet, S., and D. Fink-Hafner (in print), Democratic Transition in Slovenia: Value 
Transformation, Education, Media, Texas A&M University Press 
 
Richardson, J. (1996), ‘Policy-making in the EU: Interests, Ideas and Garbage Cans of 
Primeval Soup,’ in J. Richardson, ed., European Union: Power and Policy-Making, London: 
Routledge.  
 
Rosamond, B. (2000), Theories of European Integration, Houndmills, Basingstoke and New 
York: Palgrave. 
 
Ruus, J. (1999), ‘Democratization in Estonia’, in M. Kaldor and I. Vejvoda, eds., 
Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, London and New York: Pinter, pp. 25–37. 
 
Ruutsoo, R. (1996), ‘Formation of Civil Society Types and Organiaztional Capital of the Baltic 
Nations in the Framework of the Russian Empire’, in K. Heikkinen and E. Zdravomyslova, 
eds., Civil Society in the European North: Concept and Context, St. Petersburg: Centre for 
Independent Social Research, pp.101–8. 
 
Spanou, C. (1998), ‘European Integration in Administrative Terms: A Framework for Analysis 
and the Greek Case’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 5, pp. 467–84. 
 
Vari, A. (1998), Civil Society and Public Participation: Recent Trends in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Budapest: Institute for Social Conflict Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
http://www.sfu.ca/cedc/research/civilsoc/cari.htm, 15 August 2003. 
 
Vass, L. (2000), ‘Hungarian Public Administration Reform and EU Accession’, in EU –
Enlargement to the East: Public Administration in Eastern Europe and European Standards, 
Warszawa: Institute of Political Sciences, University of Warsaw and Fundacija Politeja, pp. 
217–34. 
 
Wallace, H. (1977), ‘Negotiation, Conflict, and Compromise: The Elusive Pursuit of Common 
Policies’, in H. Wallace et al. (eds.), Policy-making in the European Community, Chuchester: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
 
   36
Other sources 
 
Accession Partnership, 1999 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/ap_02_00/en/ap_slo_99.pdf> 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Estonia 
<http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_206/aken_prindi/1006.html> 
 
Europa. European Commission. Enlargement 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/> 
 
 